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In Federalist n. 51 James Madison obser-
ved that there is a double protection for
rights in the US. Both the federal and state
constitutions have bills of rights restricting
government, and this double security is made
effective through the federal and state judi-
ciaries, each of which bears a responsibility
for enforcing constitutional rights. Thus, we
see in the US dual guarantees and dual
guarantors. In this article, I will outline the
legal foundations of this system, describe
how this system has developed and operated
over time, and consider what lessons, if any,
the experience of the United States might
provide for other federal systems.
Let me begin by sketching the three
legal principles underlying this system of
dual protections. First of all, in the present
day, both federal and state bills of rights
protect against the violation of rights by
state governments. This was not always the
case. When the federal Bill of Rights was
adopted, its proponents were concerned to
rein in what they feared was an unduly
powerful national government, and there-
fore the restrictions of the Bill of Rights
applied only against that government. The
initial system for protection of rights was,
thus, a system of parallel rather than double
protection, with state bills or declarations
of rights protecting against state violations,
and the federal Bill of Rights protecting
against federal violations. The adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution in 1868 was designed to pro-
vide the federal government with more
power to remedy state violations of rights.
Relying on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme
Court began early in the twentieth century,
through a process known as selective incor-
poration, to gradually extend the protecti-
ons of the federal Bill of Rights to prohibit
state violations of rights. By the 1960s this
process of selective incorporation was more
or less complete, so that virtually all the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights applied
equally against state governments and the
federal government. As a result of this
process of incorporation, what was origi-
nally a system of divided responsibilities –
the federal Bill of Rights protecting against
federal violations, and state constitutions
protecting against state violations – was
transformed into a system of concurrent
responsibility, a system of double protec-
tion. Both the federal Constitution and state
constitutions, both federal courts and state
courts, can now be brought to bear against
state violations of rights.
_____________
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The second crucial legal principle is
that, in interpreting state and federal law,
the federal Supreme Court serves as the
ultimate interpreter of the federal law,
including the Constitution, but each state
supreme court as the ultimate interpreter of
its state’s law, including the constitution of
that state. The U.S. Supreme Court can
review the rulings of state supreme courts
whenever federal law is involved. For
example, were a person arrested and char-
ged with possession of drugs under state
criminal law, he might argue in state court
that the evidence against him should be
excluded from trial since it was seized in
violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment. Ultimately, since there is a
federal constitutional claim involved, the
U.S. Supreme Court could review the ru-
ling of the state court. This Supreme Court
review helps ensure that state courts inter-
pret the federal Constitution in line with
authoritative Supreme Court precedent –
state courts are not permitted to give either
a broader or narrower reading of federal
constitutional rights than has been given by
the US Supreme Court.
However, let me change the scenario
slightly. Suppose that the defendant made
no claim under the federal constitution but
merely claimed that the police search vi-
olated the state constitution or state statu-
tory law. In such a case, where the state
court ruling is based exclusively on state
law, on what judges typically refer to as
“independent and adequate state grounds,”
there would be no possibility of review by
the U.S. Supreme Court. When federal law
is not implicated, the decision of the state
supreme court on state law, including state
bills of rights, is final and not subject to
appellate review. The fact that rulings
based exclusively on state bills of rights are
insulated from review by the U.S. Supreme
Court has become a crucial tactical consi-
deration for civil-liberties groups as they
plot their litigation strategies.
 The final legal principle is that federal
law is supreme within its sphere, so that
when federal and state law conflict, federal
law prevails. States and state courts there-
fore cannot recognize less in the way of
rights for their residents than is required by
federal law. Federal law creates a national
minimum of rights or, in the words of one
state court, “the least common denomina-
tor” of rights protection. But in the U.S.
federal system, states and state courts can
provide more protection for rights than is
required as a matter of federal law.
And since the early 1970s, that is
precisely what the states have done. From
1950 to 1969, in only ten cases did state
judges rely on state guarantees of rights to
afford greater protection than was available
under the federal Constitution. However,
from 1970 to 2000, they did so in more
than one thousand cases. Scholars refer to
this resurgence of state civil-liberties law,
this new willingness of state courts to
provide greater protections than are avai-
lable under federal constitutional law, as
the new judicial federalism. Federal cons-
titutional law still remains the primary
protection for rights in the US and the
primary source of constitutional doctrine.
But state constitutional law today serves as
a complement to – and occasionally as an
antidote to – federal pronouncements.
The development of this new judicial
federalism raises a question, however. The
governing legal principles that we have
reviewed have not changed over time. Why
then has the role of state courts and of state
bills of rights changed? Why did the new
judicial federalism arise when it did?
The standard account is that the new
judicial federalism dates from the early
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1970s and is closely linked to changes in
personnel on the U.S. Supreme Court, best
symbolized by the appointment of Warren
Burger to succeed Earl Warren as chief
justice. These personnel changes alarmed
civil-liberties advocates, who expected that
the reconstituted Supreme Court would
erode the gains they had made during the
Warren Court era, particularly with regard
to the rights of defendants in criminal
cases. In retrospect, it appears that these
fears were exaggerated: the Burger Court
did not launch a full-scale assault on Mapp
v. Ohio, Miranda v. Arizona, or other
landmark Warren Court rulings. But whe-
ther these fears were warranted or not is
not really the issue, at least for present
purposes. What is crucial is the response
of these civil-liberties groups, which was
to look for alternative means to safeguard
rights, a search that led them eventually to
embrace state bills of rights.
On initial inspection, this might seem an
odd choice. State bills of rights protect
many of the same set of fundamental rights
– the freedoms of speech and of the press,
religious liberty, and protections for defen-
dants – that are found in the federal Bill of
Rights, and state courts had not been aggres-
sive (to put it mildly) in enforcing.those
guarantees. Nevertheless, several factors
made these state bills of rights attractive to
rights advocates. First, state judges inter-
preting state bills of rights are not obliged
to conform their interpretations to the rulin-
gs of federal courts interpreting analogous
federal provisions. Even when the language
is identical or nearly identical, state judges
are interpreting a unique document, with a
unique history, and this uniqueness may
justify a different interpretation. Moreover,
even if the federal courts have interpreted
an identical provision in a nearly identical
case, the federal ruling is not binding –
states are the ultimate interpreters of their
state constitutions, and they may simply
disagree, they need not assume that the
federal interpretation is the best legal inter-
pretation.
Second, even when the state guarantees
are analogous to those found in the federal
Bill of Rights–for example, state guaran-
tees of freedom of speech and of religious
liberty – they are often framed in distinc-
tive language. In particular, they are often
more specific than their federal counter-
parts. For example, in addition to prohibi-
ting governmental establishment of religi-
on, nineteen states specifically bar religious
tests for witnesses or jurors, and thirty-five
prohibit expenditures for “any sectarian
purpose”. These textual differences may
provide the basis for interpretations diver-
ging from those emanating from the US
Supreme Court.
Third, many state declarations of rights
contain additional protections that have no
federal analogue. For example, thirty-nine
states guarantee access to a legal remedy
to those who suffer injuries, eleven expres-
sly protect a right to privacy, and seventeen
expressly protect gender equality. Thus,
these constitutions offer the prospect of
extending rights protections beyond those
recognized by the Warren Court.
Fourth – and most important – under the
doctrine of “independent and adequate
state grounds,” rulings based solely on state
law are not subject to federal review. This
means that expansive state rulings, if based
on state rights guarantees, are insulated
from reversal by the Supreme Court. Thus,
the standard account of the new judicial
federalism emphasizes that the shift to state
bills of rights represented a tactical maneu-
ver by groups eager to evade what they
perceived as a less hospitable federal cons-
titutional law.
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This is accurate as far as it goes. But
in focusing on the incentives of litigants to
rely on state constitutional guarantees, it
ignores an important question: when liti-
gants first advanced state constitutional
arguments, why were state supreme courts
receptive to those arguments? After all,
historically state judges have been far less
aggressive than their federal counterparts
in initiating legal change, and until the
advent of the new judicial federalism, their
contributions to civil-liberties law were
minimal. What prompted them to adopt a
more rights-protective posture in the 1970s
and thereafter, thereby supporting the
emergence of the new judicial federalism?
The answer to those questions, I believe,
lies in the recognition that state constitu-
tional interpretation in the United States
occurs in the context of – and is influenced
by – a broader American legal tradition.
Part of this tradition involves standards of
appropriate judicial practice, which are
best understood as prescribing a
range of legitimate interpretive strategi-
es rather than rigid rules governing judicial
practice. These standards also change over
time; and justices of state supreme courts,
like their federal counterparts, both parti-
cipate in creating those standards and res-
pond to them. As judges become educated
as to the prevailing standards, these stan-
dards affect how they approach their work.
Thus most state supreme court justices, I
suspect, have learned how to interpret their
state constitutions by watching how other
courts (both federal and state) interpret
their own constitutions. Litigants have also
played a role here, of course, providing the
opportunity for state constitutional inter-
pretation by ensuring that appropriate cla-
ims and arguments, pioneered in other
judicial arenas, are brought before the
supreme courts of their states.
Now consider how this relates to the
emergence of the new judicial federalism.
When state supreme courts began to give
broad readings to their state guarantees of
rights in the 1970s, they were willing to do
so because they had reason to believe that
such a course was legitimate. For in inter-
preting the federal Bill of Rights, the U.S.
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl
Warren had supplied a model as to how a
court should approach the interpretation of
rights guarantees. Indeed, as one state
supreme court justice has put it: “When I
was in law school, [Justices] Warren and
Brennan were my heroes.” This also helps
explain why state supreme courts did not
develop civil-liberties law during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. Al-
though the existence of state constitutional
guarantees and the absence of federal
involvement appeared to afford an oppor-
tunity for state judicial initiatives, these
were necessary but not sufficient conditi-
ons. What was missing was a model of how
state supreme courts could develop a civil-
liberties jurisprudence. Because Americans
had not come to rely on courts to vindicate
civil liberties, state supreme courts throu-
ghout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries gained little experience in inter-
preting civil-liberties guarantees–few cases
were brought to them. Nor could they
during that period look to federal courts for
guidance in interpreting their constitutional
protections. The federal courts likewise
decided few civil-liberties cases during this
era, and their rulings often revealed little
sympathy for rights claimants. Only when
circumstances brought a combination of
state constitutional arguments, plus an
example of how a court might develop its
state’s constitutional guarantees, could a
state civil-liberties jurisprudence emerge.
Thus, when the appointment of Chief Jus-
THE DOUBLE PROTECTION FOR RIGHTS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 341
(Conferências e Debates) Revista Brasileira de Direito Constitucional, N. 2, jul./dez. – 2003
tice Warren Burger encouraged civil-liber-
ties litigants to look elsewhere for redress,
the experience of the preceding decades
had laid the foundation for the develop-
ment of state civil-liberties law.
Some rather ironic conclusions follow
from this argument. First, although the
activism of the Warren Court has often
been portrayed as detrimental to federa-
lism, my argument suggests that this acti-
vism was a necessary condition for state
supreme courts becoming actively involved
in protecting civil liberties. The protection
of civil liberties is not a zero-sum game,
in which increased activity by one set of
courts necessitates decreased activity by
the other. Rather, the relationship between
the federal and state judiciaries in the US
involves a sharing of responsibility and a
process of mutual learning, such that a
change in orientation by one set of courts
tends over time to be reflected in the other
set of courts as well.
This leads to a second conclusion. Al-
though the new judicial federalism rests on
the doctrine of independent and adequate
state grounds, the actual independence of
state courts from federal law is far from
complete. This is reflected in the wholesale
transfer of doctrinal categories, such as
“compelling state interest” and “suspect
classifications,” from federal to state cons-
titutional law. Moreover, even as state
supreme courts base their rulings on their
own state constitutions, on independent
and adequate state grounds, their approach
to the interpretation of those grounds has
been heavily influenced by the U.S. Supre-
me Court’s approach to interpreting the
federal Bill of Rights. I want to emphasize
that this is not a criticism of state courts,
merely a description reflecting the fact that
there is a common American legal culture
on which all courts draw.
If one switches the focus from the
development of the new judicial federalism
to its status today, two things stand out.
First, the new judicial federalism is no
longer new or controversial. In saying this,
I do not deny that specific decisions based
on state bills of rights continue to excite
controversy and sometimes are even over-
turned by state constitutional amendments.
Yet it is important to recognize what is–and
what is not – at stake in these situations.
The dispute typically concerns whether the
state supreme court has properly interpre-
ted the state constitution, not whether it was
appropriate for it to consult the state cons-
titution or to enforce its guarantees. The
question in the American states is no longer
whether the independent interpretation of
state constitutions is legitimate–that is sim-
ply taken for granted – but rather whether
particular interpretations of those constitu-
tions are legally defensible.
Second, the new-judicial-federalism
agenda of state supreme courts is no longer
driven primarily by the rulings of the US
Supreme Court. As I noted earlier, the new
judicial federalism originated in reaction to
the rulings–or anticipated rulings – of the
Burger Court, particularly in the criminal
justice area, and the majority of early
rulings under the new judicial federalism
involved the rights of defendants. Other
early state constitutional rulings involved
the reform of public school finance, which
itself became a state constitutional issue
after the US Supreme Court in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez
foreclosed consideration of the issue under
the federal Constitution. State civil-liberti-
es law thus began as a fall-back position,
a second-best approach, when the preferred
approach of federal constitutional protec-
tion was unavailable. And the state cons-
titutional agenda was largely determined,
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ironically enough, by the adverse decisions
of the US Supreme Court.
But in more recent years, important
state constitutional issues have arisen that
do not reflect disappointment about the
decisions emanating from the nation’s
capital. Let me highlight two of these
issues. The first involves gay rights – more
specifically the right of gay and lesbian
couples to marry. This issue has never been
specifically addressed by the US Supreme
Court, and indeed, the Supreme Court has
until recently had little to say about the
rights of homosexuals. However, state
courts, relying on state constitutions, have
weighed in on the issue. In 1993 the Hawaii
Supreme Court ruled that denying marriage
licenses to gay and lesbian couples violated
the state constitution. Five years later, an
Alaska court concluded that marriage was
a fundamental right and that barring same-
sex marriages amounted to sex discrimina-
tion in violation of the Alaska Constitution.
And in 1999 the Vermont Supreme Court
ruled that the state constitution guaranteed
gay and lesbian couples the same legal
rights and benefits of marriage enjoyed by
heterosexual couples, and it ordered the
Vermont Legislature to craft a law that
would satisfy the ruling, either by legali-
zing gay marriage or by creating an equi-
valent partnership structure. A direct chal-
lenge to a ban on gay marriage is currently
making its way through the Massachusetts
courts.
Another emerging area in state consti-
tutional law, likewise one in which federal
courts have played little role, involves the
intersection of constitutional law and tort
law. Within the US, business interests,
insurance companies, and the medical pro-
fession have long complained that tort-law
legal doctrines unduly favor plaintiffs, and
that juries in tort cases, especially when
those cases pit ordinary citizens against
large corporations, tend to award compen-
satory and punitive damages that are arbi-
trary and excessive. Whatever the validity
of those charges, they have received a
sympathetic hearing from state legislators,
who have enacted so-called tort-reform
statutes designed to shift the balance of
power between plaintiffs and defendants.
Among the provisions found in these tort-
reform statutes are limits on joint and
several liability, caps on punitive damages,
and statutes of repose that set a time limit
on manufacturers’ liability for injuries
caused by their defective products. The
plaintiffs’ bar has challenged several of
these statutes, claiming that they violate
various state constitutional guarantees, in-
cluding the right to a jury trial and the right
to redress of grievances. In several states
– including Illinois, Ohio, and Oregon –
these constitutional challenges have succe-
eded. However, the issue is far from deci-
ded–new reform statutes are likely to spa-
wn new litigation. Indeed, the plaintiffs’
and defendants’ bars are likely to contest
the issue of tort reform throughout the
country, in state after state, both in cases
before state supreme courts and in judicial
elections that will determine the composi-
tion of the courts deciding these constitu-
tional disputes. It seems likely that this will
be the salient state constitutional issue of
first decade of the 21st century, and it is one
that has emerged altogether independently
of the rulings of the US Supreme Court.
The states’ experience with regard to
same-sex marriages and tort reform points
out another key feature of how the new
judicial federalism operates, namely, that it
is intimately bound up with the political
process in the states. The federal Consti-
tution is difficult to amend, and on only five
occasions has it been altered to overturn
THE DOUBLE PROTECTION FOR RIGHTS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 343
(Conferências e Debates) Revista Brasileira de Direito Constitucional, N. 2, jul./dez. – 2003
Supreme Court rulings. In contrast, state
constitutions are relatively easy to amend,
and voters are not at all reluctant to change
their constitutions, even their state decla-
rations of rights, in order to overrule
judicial decisions with which they disagree.
Hawaii and Alaska did so with regard to
gay marriage, adopting amendments con-
firming that marriage was confined to
heterosexual couples. Nor are voters bashful
about removing judges who render unpo-
pular decisions, a real possibility in states
that either elect their judges or require
periodic popular review of their performan-
ce in office. Controversial state constituti-
onal rulings may thus start, rather than
conclude constitutional debates, and the
participants in those debates are likely to
include legislators, interest groups, and
ordinary citizens, as well as judges. Some
view this as a negative, but I disagree. I
think the involvement of the populace in
constitutional debate is a particularly at-
tractive feature of the system of dual
protection of rights that has developed in
the US.
Let me summarize to this point. From a
theoretical perspective, under the American
system of rights protection, the federal go-
vernment provides the base, the constituti-
onal minimum, ensuring the protection of
fundamental (universal) rights, while state
protections build upon that base, providing
whatever additional protections the citizens
of the state deem appropriate. From the
institutional perspective, the logic is slightly
different. The initial responsibility for pro-
tecting rights often rests with the states, both
their political branches and their courts.
Federal intervention usually occurs as a result
of litigation, when the states have failed to
meet their responsibilities.
The key question remains: does the
system of dual protection that I have
described make sense for other federal
systems? One should be cautious about
transplanting practices and institutions from
one cultural and historical context to ano-
ther. Nevertheless, let me offer some thou-
ghts.
Whether it makes sense to allow states
a role in defining and protecting rights
beyond the federal minimum may depend,
at least in part, on how one expects that this
power will be exercised. The experience of
the US may offer some clues. First of all,
states may be expected to enshrine guaran-
tees that reflect changes in political pers-
pective that have occurred since the time
the federal bill of rights was written. For
example, the US Constitution does not
expressly recognize positive rights – such
as rights to housing, to medical care, and
the like – and the Supreme Court has
rejected claims that such rights are implicit
in the document. This absence of positive
rights may reflect the emphasis on “nega-
tive rights” (protections against govern-
ment intrusions) in the late 18th century, at
the time the federal Bill of Rights was
adopted, or perhaps federalism concerns.
Whatever the reason, the absence of pro-
tections for positive rights has created an
opportunity for state constitution-makers.
Most state constitutions are more recent
than the federal Constitution, and many
include positive rights. During the late
nineteenth century, as public education
emerged as the most important state res-
ponsibility, most state constitutions impo-
sed a duty on state government to provide
a quality education to all children (which
has readily translated into a right to a
quality education). During the 1930s, the
era of the Great Depression, NY introduced
a right to housing and a right to welfare,
and during the 1940s NJ instituted a right
of collective bargaining. More recently,
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several states have added guarantees of a
right to a clean environment to their cons-
titutions.
States may also be expected to include
in their bills of rights protections reflecting
values that are dominant in the particular
state, even if those values are not accepted
nationwide. For example, the federal Cons-
titution prohibits cruel and unusual punish-
ments, but some states have gone further,
either banning the death penalty or, in the
case of Utah, requiring that those impriso-
ned “not be treated with unnecessary ri-
gor.” Other states have gone the other
direction, including provisions emphasi-
zing that they retain the right to impose the
death penalty. The system of dual protec-
tion has thus assisted in accommodating
differences in fundamental values.
States may also be expected to include
additional rights guarantees because of
distinctive features of the state population.
The US Constitution does not directly
address the rights of groups, but these
rights do find some recognition in state
constitutions, particularly in states with
concentrations of ethnic or religious or
racial groups. Thus, New Mexico protects
the language rights of Hispanics, Montana
the cultural heritage of American Indians,
and Hawaii has an entire article addressed
to the cultural concerns of its native popu-
lation. Protections such as these show the
advantages of a system of dual protection
of rights. Such provisions reflect the dis-
tinctive concerns of particular states, some-
thing that could not readily be recognized
at the federal level but can gain recognition
and protection within specific states.
Finally, states may also be expected to
include in their bills of rights guarantees
not found in the federal Constitution that
reflect particular concerns within the state.
For example, California has included a
right to safe schools and a right to fish on
public lands; and Montana a right of access
to public meetings and public records.
In deciding whether a double protection
makes sense, one might also wish to con-
sider whether it fosters federal values. I
would argue that it does. Federalism is
designed to encourage pluralism and diver-
sity, and allowing states to define what
rights beyond the federal minimum they
wish to protect recognizes pluralism and
encourages diversity.
Federalism is also designed to encoura-
ge experimentation within the states, and
the experience of the US with dual protec-
tion of rights suggests that it fosters such
experimentation. On the judicial level, state
courts may feel free to interpret state
constitutions as providing greater protecti-
on for rights than is available under the
federal Constitution because they know
that their rulings will have effect only
within the borders of the state. The US
Supreme Court refused to strike down
reliance on the property tax to finance
public education, even though this resulted
in unequal funding for schools in poor
areas, because of concerns about federa-
lism, about major federal involvement in an
area traditionally the responsibility of state
and local governments. Because they are
not affected by such federalism concerns,
state courts have felt free to assess the
constitutionality of state funding schemes,
and in many instances they have required
state governments to remedy inequities.
More generally, one can note that in the
US most initiatives relating to individual
rights were pioneered by individual states,
not by the federal government. For exam-
ple, it was the state of Vermont that first
outlawed slavery, the state of Wisconsin
that initiated unemployment insurance in
the US, the state of Massachusetts that first
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instituted a minimum wage for women and
children, and the state of New York that
first established protection against racial
discrimination in employment. Only after
these initiatives were emulated in other
states did a national consensus emerge that
found expression in the Constitution or
federal statutes. Thus, in the area of rights
protection, a division of responsibility
encourages the states and the federal go-
vernment to learn from the experience of
other states.
Are there risks associated with a system
of dual protection? Yes, there are, though
I would not fear them unduly. Having more
than one government defining rights makes
things more complex and potentially more
confusing, but any country that embraces
federalism must know that it is simulta-
neously embracing complexity in govern-
ment. Creating more constitutional rights
empowers judges, providing them with
more opportunities to strike down laws,
although the possibility of overruling judi-
cial pronouncements by constitutional
amendment serves as a check. Finally,
allowing states to define rights destroys the
uniformity of rights in the country, althou-
gh since the federal Bill of Rights protects
the most fundamental rights, one may well
wonder whether diversity in this area is
more problematic than in any other area of
public policy.
 Ultimately, of course, each federal
democracy must design the institutions that
best fit its population, its history, and its
culture. The double protection of rights is
therefore unlikely to be desirable in all
federal systems. But in the US the double
protection for rights that Madison envisi-
oned is a reality, and I would suggest that
it is one of the most positive features of
American federalism.
